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The recent past has seen a renewal of the conflict between science and religion. In its 
present version the conflict appears irreconcilable. Attempts to resolve the debate such as 
Steven Jay Gould’s notion of dual magisteriums fail to resonate in the present; 
alternatively, the authors sponsored by or in pursuit of the Templeton prize who mean to 
reconcile science and religion convince only themselves.  Is it possible to remain 
uncommitted without paying the price of superficiality or sacrificing intellectual probity? 
The aim of this paper is to articulate a third way which accomplishes this goal. 
 
The first chapter of Genesis will be a synecdoche for what is called Religion. Speaking  
hermeneutically, the most important verse in the Bible is Deuteronomy 4.6. It makes a 
claim for the Bible: “…this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the 
peoples, that, when they hear all these statutes, shall say: ‘Surely this great nation is a 
wise and understanding people.” This argues the merits of the book by submitting it to 
the judgment of the wise who are not part of the community of its intended auditors. Who 
can be a judge of wisdom other than the wise? It may be the earliest reference to a 
consensus sapientum. It implicitly enjoins the reader to participate in a dialogue that 
involves a third party: the wise of the nations. How can we operationalize, that is, put into 
effect, this injunction?  
 
 2 
 
One solution is to follow the example of the Bible which begins its story of the discovery 
of the way par excellence for human beings with the story of an individual, Abraham; 
here we also begin with an individual, Socrates, a cynosure of the life of the mind as an 
autonomous activity, or, wisdom as a cross cultural phenomenon unmarked by the 
peculiarities of this or that culture or cave. Socratic wisdom, or Socratic ignorance, seems 
appropriate to the task. It is alive to an aspect of human wisdom that is open to the 
possibility of permanent human problems. His dictum, “I know that I know nothing,” 
sheds its paradoxical character if interpreted as a knowledge of ignorance, or, the 
understanding of problems not their solutions. For example, one knows one’s ignorance 
about justice not by a good will declaration of one’s ignorance but only if one is able to 
raise fundamental questions about justice which point to answers without being certain of 
their adequacy. With this model of open minded skepticism let us begin to read the Bible. 
 
In English, the opening words of the Bible are “In the Beginning…” Here at once we run 
into a quasi paradox. The English phrase, “In the beginning…” translates one Hebrew 
word, bereshit, which, in Biblical usage, literally means, “in the beginning of…”. That is, 
every other time it is used in the Bible, it is always related to something else, e.g. in the 
beginning of spring. Here in its first use, at the beginning, it is used without being related 
to anything. The first words of the Bible are, literally, “In the beginning of…G-d created 
the heaven and the earth.” An inference can be drawn rich in hermeneutic consequence. 
The beginning suggests a problem, an aporia, to use a term familiar to Socrates and to the 
philosophic tradition. What is beginning at the beginning? Why is it not named?  A 
polemical inference can be drawn. The beginning is a rebuke to those who call the Bible 
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inerrant. It begins with an aporia that implies a problem with naming the unity whose 
parts are Heaven and Earth. What inerrant proposition can this be implying? It begins to 
look like those who defend the Bible’s inerrancy do so as a result of reading it too 
literally because they read it not literally enough. The point is not that the Bible is not 
inerrant but rather that the first need is to understand what the Bible is stating in its most 
universal mode, addressing the wise. This is an issue that all magisterial books raise.  
 
Questions of this sort abound. Who is speaking? What is the authority of this narrative 
voice? What about creation itself: is creation ex nihilo implied, even allowed for? What 
does creation mean? Focusing on this last question, will lead to a better grasp of the 
aporia of the nameless beginning. Creation results in the production of separate things, or, 
one of creation’s key principles is that of separation. Accordingly, the first act of creation 
is the creation of that whereby things are distinguishable from one another namely light. 
The second act of separation or creation, made possible by light and its absence, is that 
between day and night. One can wonder that there are days before the sun which marks 
the days and which is created later on the fourth day. This leads to the “most glaring 
difficulty” of the first chapter of Genesis; whereas the sun is produced on day 4, 
vegetables and plants are the result of day 3. How can there be plants and vegetables 
without the activity of the sun? 
 
A structural feature of the first six days sheds light on this difficulty. The first and second 
days are marked by single acts of creation, light and the firmament, whereas the third day 
is marked by a double act of creation. On day three the vegetable world is created and 
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land and sea are separated. Days four and five also see single acts of creation: the 
heavenly bodies on day four; the swarming beasts on day five. And just as the third day is 
marked by a double act of creation, so is the sixth day, with the creation of  man and the 
land animals. The structure of the six days appears as a pair of three days which are 
parallel to one another.  Days 1 and 4 are analogous,  light on day one and its source, the 
sun on day 4;  days 2 and  5 are parallel: the firmament or air and water on day 2, and the 
birds and fishes on day 5 that swarm in the air and water; and, lastly, the double creations 
of days 3 and 6. In addition, and most importantly, all the created items in the second set 
of three days have a level of complexity missing from the things created in the first three 
days. Whereas the things of the first three days are separate, the creations of days four 
through six are separate and capable of separating themselves from stationariness through 
local motion. This allows for the separation, from the things moving, the background to 
their motion. Because of this doubleness,  the creatures of the second set can be said to be 
higher, i.e. more important or better in the order of complexity, than those of the first set.  
 
We can conclude that the Bible entails normative inferences based upon evidence 
accessible through everyday experience. This implies that a cross-culturally meaningful 
account of the world must be “based on evident distinctions which are as accessible to us 
as they were to the biblical author,” which is to say that “all the created things are 
accessible to man as man regardless of differences of climate, origin, religion, or 
anything else.”1 Third, the Bible suggests intellectual distinctions based on everyday 
experience which provide a structural basis for understanding the world and its origins. 
This includes, separation, the phenomenological basis of sameness and otherness, or 
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identity and difference, and motion and rest, which are the most fundamental 
philosophical distinctions. 
  
In other words, we see that Genesis 1 has several functions. It is descriptive, laying out 
the things of the visible world, of the heavens above, the earth below, and of what is in 
between. It implicitly suggests noetic or intellectual principles which emerge out of the 
descriptions, for example, separation, and local motion. It is normative, for example rank 
ordering the created things in terms of complexity. Finally, it is etiological, giving an 
account of the cause or causes of the visible world.  
 
In light of these principles we can see that the place of the sun, late in creation, on day 4, 
and its description as a “light” which marks days, serve to demote its importance. It is not 
named. It is a mere light to measure the passage of time. This foreshadows what comes 
later, the sun is allotted to the peoples, non-Jews, as their god (Deut 4.19). It is merely a 
time marker, not something worthy of worship. This agrees with the ancient philosophers 
who observe that the heavenly bodies are the object of natural worship (Plato Epinomis 
976c7—992e1, Symposium 190a8-b5; cf. Aristotle Metaphysics Lambda). The 
descriptive surface yields intellectual distinctions and is in turn organized through a 
normative goal: demoting the value of the heavenly bodies as objects of worship.  
 
In conclusion, then, the Bible as a synecdoche for religion, allows for a rational observer 
to weigh its teaching in light of everyday experience accessible to all human beings; 
further it implies intellectual principles whose rationality is open to examination, and 
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lastly, it contains a normative teaching based on this common experience. It does not 
require any adherence other than the agreement of unaided reason. One last point before 
we pass on to science to see that it too allows for a tertium quid of rational observation. 
This concerns the etiological element of the Bible. This is one of the most complex issue 
raised by Genesis. To pursue it we would need to tackle the issue of the status of the 
narrative voice, which, to my knowledge, has never been addressed with complete clarity. 
Only with this answered can we make a firm judgment about the etiological issue. Still, it 
can be said, that by failing to name the whole as a cosmos, and, as a result, not unified, 
not the one thing it would be in virtue of having a name, Genesis 1 is true to this part of 
its rhetorical function: it demotes the cosmos as a unity and hence as a possible object of 
worship.  
 
A prima facie case has been made for an intellectual honest tertium quid which does not 
blanch at taking religion seriously nor hesitate at maintaining its independence from a 
polemical stance in favor of religion over science.  
 
There can be little doubt about the theoretical and practical achievements of modern 
natural science. Descartes, one of the founders of the modern project whose instrument is 
modern natural science, claimed that it would make us “masters and possessors of 
nature.” Theoretically and practically, if only in comparison with Descartes’ day and all 
prior times, we have taken giant steps towards achieving this goal. Practically, as 
Descartes would have it, we can look to medicine as the proof of this, while theoretically 
the strides made in understanding the phenomenon of life as well as the constitution of 
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the universe solidify Descartes’ claim. This achievement is not without its ambiguities. 
For example, the claim made some two thousand ago that the human species is one not 
only biologically but also morally had to wait until the middle of the 20th century to 
become an existential fact as sure as it is that we are bipedal hominids. About fifty years 
ago through the power of nuclear arms we became collectively responsible for life on 
earth, an achievement at best ambiguous in its genesis and charged with risk in its 
actuality.  
 
With that said, we must ask if science also allows for a tertium quid, an intellectually 
honest stance which understands without become partisan.  
 
Aristotle makes a distinction with regard to the starting point of inquires, between that 
which is first to us and that which is first in itself, with the understanding that the former, 
everyday experience, is the obvious or natural starting point for inquiries. It is here, 
thinking about what is first to us, that the tertium quid of rational observation finds a 
ground common to science and religion, or, more narrowly, to the Bible and the 
mathematical physics which is at the core of modern natural science. This common 
ground is where the tertium quid makes its stand. The Aristotelian distinction allows for 
this in two ways. 
 
First, at the heart of the perceived inconsistency between Religion and Science is a 
perceived tension between their views of the whole. It is thought that if scientific 
cosmogonies, with a big bang and an expanding universes requiring billions of years are 
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true then the Book of Genesis, with its finite view of heaven and earth, its mere six days 
of creation can not be true. But there is a difference between cosmogony and cosmology. 
The first is etiological in character; the second descriptive. To be sure the respective 
cosmogonies are prima facie inconsistent.  On the other hand both accounts are logically 
dependent on a common descriptive base, that is, on what is accessible to all human 
beings, or, the common cosmology of human experience. However much this is open to 
revision through scientific means of observation which extends the range and character of 
human experience beyond the eye, nevertheless the original experience is basic to both 
perspectives. Or, what comes to the same thing, however much scientific cosmogonies 
and cosmologies may be revised by future discoveries and observations, there are no 
rational grounds for supposing that the common starting point of everyday cosmological 
certainty will not remain constant and hence the starting point for all future revisions 
technical or theoretical of scientific claims. 
 
Aristotle’s distinction also points to a fundamental fact about the procedures of modern 
natural science.  A basic premise of science is that its findings are defeasible or revisable. 
Because its findings are subject to complex rules of validation, no finding is secure once 
and for all. For example a day may, with the emphasis on the mere methodological sense 
of the word “may,” --  a day may come when it is normative science that the law of force 
which now as we know from Newton’s Principia is F=ma, will be F=ma2. On the other 
hand, there are no rational grounds for supposing that what is humanly first to us will not 
be the starting place for epistemically confirming science’s laws and hypotheses. 
However more sophisticated scientific equipment may be at some point in the future, it 
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will still be a fact that human beings process data through their sensoria and actualize 
their projects through the dispositions with which human beings have done and are doing 
so. There is only one thing that can shake one’s confidence in this proposition. We can 
play with the hyperbolic skeptical assumption whereby the logical possibility of the 
negation of any proposition is a ratio dubitandi for that proposition. Or, to put it as simply 
as possible, only an irrational skepticism threatens this common ground. But remember 
what we need is a rational tertium quid which ipso facto rules out this form of skepticism.  
 
In addition, the theoretical implications of modern natural science raise questions of a 
permanent character. These questions point to the need for the rational observer to engage 
science, as well as keep a respectful distance, as readily as religion or the Bible is 
engaged. 
 
First, its key terminology is in an important respect nominalistic. Important terms, such as 
force, gravity and energy do not name things in the world. We can imagine them as labels 
on a jar within which are mathematical formulas descriptive and predictive of the world, 
demonstrated by deductive arguments as often as not, and many of which have premises 
linked to observations about the world. But do these labels name the causes of the effects 
so described? Newton who above all others instaured this mode of  understanding the 
world said it as succinctly as it can be said. He writes in the Principia that he was unable 
to find “the causes” for the effects under the rubric of gravity that he spelled out in 
mathematical terms (Principia 530). 
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Second, because of this science does not yield a clear ontology. More exactly, it does not 
allow for an understanding of matter. Matter is an amphibolous word. In every day 
language it names what is tangible. Under the lens of science what it names is anything 
but tangible; tangibility here is an effect of things intangible, molecules etcetera. What 
exists if we take our bearings by this second understanding of matter?  At the foundation 
of mathematical physics, Descartes offered extension as a understanding of being or what 
exists which is consistent with physics. Extension and its many variants, lives with us to 
this day. These run the range between space, either empty or filled, each either with or 
without an active principal, each either infinite or not, and, as well, another offering, this 
by Leibniz, monads, with the same possibilities. These options are open to careful 
examination in the writings of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Kant. It is hard to for me 
to imagine that future incarnations of the metaphysical implications of mathematical 
physics are not covered by these possibilities. Whether any scientific or conceptual 
revolution can bring closure to this aporia in a manner that the ontology implied by 
mathematical physics is settled probably depends on a solution to the final difficulty with 
which science confronts us. 
 
Third, and of the greatest importance science raises a fundamental aporia about the 
relationship of thought and being. With the inception of the new symbolic mathematics 
that led from Descartes through Newton to Leibniz to what we now recognize as 
mathematical physics, a fundamental metaphysical issue has been reawakened. No one  
has given an account of the harmony between the “abstract” – and here the quotes are 
scare quotes – discoveries of the new mathematics and the stuff of the world, either on 
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the macroscopic level such as planets or on the microscopic such as electrons. This 
astonishing harmony between mathematics and the world has been described in many 
ways, by Leibniz and Kant and others. Its capacity to astonish is our gain. The immense 
constructions of mathematical physics brought about by the conjunction of these two 
words  -- mathematics and physics – generates a philosophical aporia, a reminder that 
Parmenides’ words about the congruence of Being and Thought is not the statement of a 
solution to a philosophical problem but rather the statement of a problem simpliciter. Our 
version of this problem was born of the “unknown universe” unlocked by the new 
mathematics, best represented by Leibniz’ descendants such as Euler. Perhaps a more 
appropriate metaphor than unknown universe that captures the open ended process of 
mathematical discoveries unlocked by symbolic abstraction, is Machiavelli’s  phrase 
“new continents” because it serves to remind us of the practical roots and consequences 
of these new modes and orders. 
 
In conclusion, this paper has made a prima facie case for a tertium quid, that of the 
rational observer of science and religion, one who remains unseduced by either but 
enlightened even delighted by both, potentially, on a daily basis. 
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